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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Pl.aintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
IV A LEE GILLIAN, 
Def endant-Appeltant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CA·SE 
Case No. 
11314 
This is a criminal proceeding in which the defendant, 
Iva Lee Gillian, was charged with 'the crime of murder in 
the first degree, in violaition of Title 76, Ohaipter 30, Sec-
tion 1, Utah Code Anno'talted, 1953, by Information filed 
in the District Courlt of :tJhe Third J udidaJl District, in and 
for Sa1t Lake County, Slbwte of Urtah, on December 26, 1967. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT 
The defendant was tried before a jury, commencing 
January 30, 1968, before the HonoraJble Marcellus K. Snow. 
The defendant w:as found guilty by verdict of 'the jury, 
entered February 2, 1968, of the crime of murder in lthe 
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fin>t degree, with recommendation of leniency. Thereafter, 
on rbhe 14th day of February, 1968, defendant, Iva Lee 
Gillian, was sentenced to confinement in the Utah State 
Prison for a term od' [ife. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant Gillian seeks a new trlial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 4, 1967, the VlicitJim, Jes<Se A. Melton, 
was living with one WiIHam MiHer at Apartment No. 3, 
21 WMt 1700 South Street (Tr. 304). Mellton had been 
living with Miller for approxJimately one week prior to 
November 4, and as 1:Jhere was only one bed ~n the apart-
ment, slept on the floor alongside of Miller's bed (Tr. 305). 
The defendant had known Miller since 1958, and from 
1958 until 1962 hiad lived wi1Jh him, at least part orf the 
time (Tr. 357) .. From 1962 until 1967, the defendant con-
tinued to see Miiller from time to time, but their reliaition-
ship during that period was one of "just friends" (Tr. 
357). 
During the afternoon and evening of November 3, 
1967, the deceased and MiNer had passed their time drink-
ing some unknown quantity of wihiskey and beer (Tr. 306, 
313). Late that night one Bernice Simmons, a friend of 
the deeeased'.s, appeared at the apartment (Tr. 314), and 
the three of them - the deceased, Miller, and Mrs. Sim-
mons ,_.__ had what was described as a "Hittle party" (Tr. 
306). At some undetermined time when the party broke 
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up, the three then reitJired for the night wilth Miller and 
Mrs. S'immons sleeping ibogelther on MiHer's bed and the 
deceased sleeping on the floor (Tr. 306) . There is a di1s-
pulte in the rtestimony as to whether Miller and Mrs. Sim-
mons were dressed or undressed and whether one or the 
dther, or both, were under or on rtop of the covers of the 
bed (Tr.307,366). 
During the afternoon and evening of November 3, rllhe 
defendant had been armnging plans to go hunting wiith a 
friend, one He:ribert Gurkey (Tr. 361, 363). ThaJt evening, 
Gurkey dropped by the defendanlt's home and indicated rto 
her that the plans had dhanged and that he was nOlt going 
to be able to take her hunting. As a result of !this conver-
saiti~:m, the defendanrt wa;s quite upset and disappointed and 
took two or three phenobarbital !ta:Mets, wh!ich medication 
had been prescribed as one of several medications for treat-
ment of the defendant's diabetes and heart oondition for 
the purpose of relaxing her and permi:tting her to sleep 
(Tr. 363). Defendanlt was still unable to 1sleep and conse-
quently took more of her medication. By approximately 
5 :30 or 6 :00 o'clock iin the mornling of November 4, 1968, 
she had taken six tablets, and was consequently not lucid 
or alert as to her own actions (Tr. 365) . 
She then left her residence and ultimately arrived rut 
Miner's aparlmenrt seeking to have a cup of coffee with 
him (Tr. 366). From tha't time, and unltil the time the de-
ceased was killed, the testimony at tri'al fa at variance. 
According to the testimony of MiiHer and Simmons: 
Sometime between 6 :30 and 7 :00 o'c'lock a.m., the defen-
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dant knocked at the door of Mi.Ber's apartment. Miller got 
up and opened the door, and the defendant walked in and 
saw Mrs. Simmons -sittJing on rthe side of the bed, and the 
deceased was lying on the floor. Upon seeing Mrs. Sim-
mons and tJhe deceased, defendant asked Mil1er what they 
were d~irrg there, to whieh Miner responded rthaJt it wru; 
none of her busine.ss, whereupon, according to Miller, the 
defendant slapped him. At that point Miller pushed her 
out of the door and locked it (Tr. 297, 307-309). 
According to the defendant's testimony: After knock-
ing upon 'the door, Mr. Miller opened the door and said 
"Come in." As the defendant walked in, she observed Mrs. 
Simmons lying on the bed, and the latter immediately 
jumped up !holding the cover and said, "I got drunk last 
night." The defendant observed that Mrs. Simmons had 
no clothing on her shoulders. Miller then walked back to 
the bed and sa:'t down, and the defendant then asked, "How 
could you sleep with her when 'Speedy' [Mrs. Simmons' 
husband] is one of your best friends?" To this he replied, 
"You son-of~a-____________ so, it's none of your business" (Tr. 
366). 
"* * * and I slapped his face and as I turned 
around to walk back out he slapped me. He kept 
slapping me and I foll in the closet and he kept 
beating me and kicking me. He pulled me up by 
my blouse and slapping me and she was - Miss 
Simmons - I could hear her saying, 'No. No, Bill, 
don't. No. No, Bill. Bill, please don't.' and then he 
threw me out in the hall" (Tr. 367). 
In the melee, the defendant's blouse was torn (Tr. 368, 
Ex. 13). 
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The defendant then proceeded to her car, .got a gun 
out of it, and walked around rbo lthe weslt window of :the 
aparitmenrt (Tr. 369). The .window Sill was over five feet 
from the ground (Tr. 187), and a dvape was over the win-
dow, opened at the bo1:11Jom orrly an inch and a half to ·two 
inches (Tr. 198). 
"Q. What did you do then? 
"A. I went to my car and happened rto think 
I had the gun in the car and I thoughrt, well, I 
would - I would .scare him for hu:riting me. 
"Q. And then what did you do? What were 
you thinking about alt that ltime? 
"A. Th:at's a:ll I had 'in mind or thinking 
about. lit was thought I would scare him for beating 
upon me. My legs and wrists was bllack spots. Beat 
mostly on my head with his big hands. I -Only recaH 
shooting twice through the Window, h~igh. 
"Q. Now, before we giet inlto that, Mrs. Gil-
~ian, 'let me rusk you if you saw anyone else in the 
apa1'tment asride from BiH and Bernice and Sim-
mons? 
"A. No, I did not. 
"Q. Now, after you giot the gun what did you 
do? 
"A. Pardon? 
"Q. After you got the gun what did you do? 
"A. I went Ito the we.sit window. It was up 
(indicating) and I i!Jhoughlt I'd 1shodt up juslt to scare 
Mr. Miller. 
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"Q. And what then? Did you shoot into the 
room? 
"A. All I remember - remember is shooting 
twice and then I went back to my car and got in 
and went over to Rex and Bud's through the back 
door, tried to get a cup of coffee before I drove 
home (Tr. 368-369). 
* * * * * 
"Q. How did you feel about Bill after he 
struck you? 
"A. Well, I - I just was hurt the way -
because I would have walked out on my own and I 
didn't slap him hard in the first place. I don't like 
to be called a name. 
"Q. What did he call you? 
"A. He called me a son-of-a-bitch and I feel 
like somebody calls me that they're calling that to 
my mother and, no, I wasn't very happy the way he 
beat upon me. 
"Q. How did you feel toward him? 
"A. Well, I was very angry at him. 
"Q. Did you know a Jesse Melton? 
"A. y,es, I do. 
"Q. How long have you known Jesse Melton? 
"A. I didn't know Jesse Melton - well, off 
and on the last five years maybe I'd seen Jesse 
three or four times. But he'd always treaited me 
very nice. 
"Q. Did you have any reason to be angry at 
Jesse Melton? 
7 
"A. Oh, no. I don't think Jesse Melton would 
harm a flea. 
"Q. Did you h!ave any reason to want to kill 
him? 
"A. Oh, no. Not to kill anyone. I couldn't 
kHI anyone. 
"Q. Now, ait ,the time you were aitanding by 
the window you knew you had a gun in your hand, 
didn't you. 
"A. Yeah. 
"Q. And you knew that there were at least 
two people in the apartment, didn't you? 
"A. Yes, but I knew that Bernice Simmons, 
which I didn't know her name until afterwards. 
"Q. You knew there was a possibility if you 
fired into that room you might injure somebody, 
didn't you? 
"A. Well, I didn't think about that because it 
wasn't - I dlidn't have that intention in my mind. 
It wasn't going through my mind. 
"Q. I want you to tell the members of the 
jury, now, what you had in your mind when you 
had the pistol pointing in the ,window? 
"A. I just thought I'd make him squirm a 
little bi:t, since that wasn't the first time. He beat 
me up a few years ago. He had broken my face. 
"Q. Did you intend to shoot at Mr. Miller? 
"A. No, definite'ly not. If I had wanted to 
shoot Mr. Mill~r I would have waited until he C2.me 
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out and I certainly wouldn't have gone there to 
,shoot him. I wouldn't have done it while he had 
witnesses. 
"Q. Did you intend to injure Mr. MiHer? 
"A. No" (Tr. 372-373). 
At the trial, the court refused to permit the entire tape 
or the transcript of defendant's confession Ito go before the 
jury, allowing the District Attorney to select only such parts 
as he deemed proper for his case to go before the jury (Tr. 
425-430); permitted the prosecution to extensively cover an 
alleged prior aot of misconduct committed by the defendant 
upon William Miller some seven years before (Tr. 333, 378-
379); and finally instructed the jury that it could return 
three possible verdiots : first degree murder with a recom-
mendation of leniency, first degree murder without a rec-
ommendation of leniency, or acquittal (Tr. 80). Defendant 
had requested Instructions regarding lesser included of-
fenses which were refused (Tr. 46-49). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY REGARDING LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSES. 
A cursory reading of the transcript of this trial strikes 
one with an abiding sense of unfairness. In practical terms, 
the lawyer does not and should not feel unduly sensative 
when a court rules against h'im; however, when one finds 
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delightful surprise, GS one does when he reads this tran-
script, in a single suslbaining ruling in favor of the defense 
counsel (Tr. 241), then one can on'ly oonclude that either 
his sense of j uSltice tis perhaps rtoo idea1is1Jic, or that this 
defendant had all the cards stacked against her. The 
record is replete with instances where iUhe defendant's 
counsel was unaJble rto adequately present a defense of miti-
gation, and was ultimwtely required to argue rto the jury 
that his client, who had confessed itJo the shooting, was not 
guilty of first degree murder as charged - the only al-
ternative that the jury had by way of conviction - but 
rather should be acquitted. Thwt any defense counsel 
should be placed in such a position under 1Jhe facts of this 
case shows the inequity of the court's rulfogs against de-
fendant throughout the trial and of its instructions to the 
jury at the end of the trial. While it is, of course, this 
latter matter of which the defendant compla:ins under rthis 
Point on appeal, it is strongly urged thait 'a proper perspec-
tive of the impossible position of defendant under the in-
structions as given by the court can only be gained by a 
thorough read~ng of the entire transcript in order to gain 
insight into the atmosphere and aura of the trial which led 
up to :the conviction of this defendant. 
In its final instruction to the jury, the Court removed 
the signifiicant questions 'Of absence or presence of premed-
ta tion and deliberation from the jury, it took away from 
them those substantial and important factors of sudden 
anger and heat of passion, and indeed it took away from 
them the penultimate jury function of determining whether 
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the facts of this particular case involving this pamcular 
defendant, in the particular circumstances in which the 
incident in question arose, involved aots constituting first 
degree murder, or whether in fact the ciircumstan<:es were 
such that the defendanJt's acts constituted second degree 
murder, or something less. By its irn~tructions, the Court 
effectively precluded a consideration by the jury - just as 
though it had stricken the evidence from the record - of 
the testimony of the defendant concerning her intentions 
and her actions on that occasion. Thus the Court com-
manded the jury : 
"When you retire to deliberate you should ap-
point one of your number as foreman. Your verdict 
must be in writing, dated and signed by your fore-
man, and when found must be returned by you into 
court. 
"In this case your verdict must be with refer-
ence to the defendant Iva Lee Gillian: 
"1. Guilty of the crime of murder in the first 
degree, as charged in the Information; or 
"2. Guilty of the crime of murder in the first 
degree, as charged in the Information, with the 
recommendation of leniency; or 
"3. Not guilty" (Tr. 80). 
In giving this instruction, it is clear that the Court adopted, 
lock, stock, and barrel, the State's theory that where a per-
son is killed by an act of another, that act is inherently 
greatly dangerous and evidences a depraved mind, regard-
less of human life (Tr. 68). 
At the outset, it should be made perfectly dear that 
this is not a case involving the application of the "Felony-
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Murder rule" in which lesser included offenses cannot ex-
ist, State V. Condit, 125 P. 2d 801, nor is it a case in which 
the defendant failed to take the stand to testify regarding 
mitigating circumstances, State v. Matteri, 225 P. 2d 325 
and it is not a case where defendant failed to request in-
struotions on lesser included offenses (Tr. 46, 47, 48). 
Thus the prime question for this Court on this appeal is 
whether there was sufficient evidence before the trial 
court to require instructions regarding lesser offenses in-
cluded within the offense of murder in the first degree, as 
were requested by defendant. 
A. 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
REQUIRE INSTRUCTIONS AS TO LESSER 
HTCLUDED OFFENSES. 
The test for what is a lesser included offense is suc-
cinctly stated in State v. Brennan, 13 Utah 2d 195, 371 P. 
2d 27 ( 1962), wherein 1this Court stated at 29, 371 P. 2d: 
"The rule as to when one offense is included in 
another is that the grea:ter offense includes a lesser 
one when establislhment of the .greater would neces-
sarily include proof of all of the e'lements necessary 
to prove the lesser. Conversely, it is only when the 
proof of the lesser offense requires some element 
not involved in the greater offense that the lesser 
would not be an included offense. * * * 
"In refusing the state's [requested instructions 
as to the lesser 1included offense] it committed error 
against the state." 
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The defendant recognizes that there are some instances 
in which there is no lesser included offense for a specific 
type of first degree murder, as where the "Felony-Murder 
rule" pertains. State V. Condit, supra. And it is not un-
dlisputed that where the defendant fails Vo request insitruc-
tions as to lesser induded offenses, contrary to the fact 
situation here, the 'lower court is not requlired to so instruct 
the jury. State v. Mitchell, 3 Utah 2d 70, 278 P. 2d 618 
( 1955). Nevertheless, there is no doubt that when there 
is evidence sufficient 1Jo support a verdict of the greater 
offem;e, which necessarily includes evidence of all elements 
of the lesser offense, and vvhere, as here, the defendant re-
quested such instructions, then it is palpaJble prejudicial 
error for the trial court to omi,t instruction as to the lesser 
included offenses. State v. Ferguson, 74 Utah 263, 279 Pac. 
55 (1929). 
The record discloses that there was an abundance of 
evidence on which the jury could predicate an absence of 
premeditation and deliberation; an absence of depraved 
mind, regardless of human rife; an absence of intent; a 
presence of heat of passion 1and sudden quarrel; and the 
presence of mitigating factors which are critical in deter-
mining the essential nature of the defendant's act. Wirth 
the respective absence and presence of such factorn, a trial 
court should not make its own findings as to the weight 
to be given to such evidence by excluding it from consid-
eration by the jury, for the determination of the suffi-
ciency, weight and befievability of such evidence is 1Jhe 
prerogative of the jury and not the court. State V. Severns, 
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148 P. 2d 488 (Kans. 1944). Doubtless, the testimony of 
a defendant in a criminal prosecution 'is likeiy to be more 
weighted in her own favor, ibut tJhis is a factor which the 
jury must determine as the sole and exclusive trier of fact. 
This exclusive province of the jury is negated when the 
court, as here, effectively precludes the jury from deter-
mining, in the circumstances, that the act of defendant was 
or was not greatly dangerous to the lives of orthers, or 
whether it was or was not such an act as evidenced a de-
pmved mind, regiardless of human life. In doing so, the 
court here became an arbiter of the weight of the evidence 
and effectively said to the jury: 
You are instructed either to acquit the defen-
dant, which is incredible under the evidence, or 
you are instructed that her act, which she has ad-
mitted, was greatly dangerous to the Hves of dthers, 
evidencing a depraved mind, regardless of human 
life. 
There was sufficient evidence, in spite of the Court's di-
rected verdict, based on the testimony of the defendant 
alone, tJhe weighlt of which was to be determined by the 
jury, that the act was neither calcu1ated to put ithe lives 
of the three occupants of Miller's apartment in jeopardy 
nor the life of any one of them, ,and thus the aot was not, 
as conrtemplated by the law, a "greatly dangerous act to the 
lives of others evidencing a depraved mind, regardless of 
human life." 
The dilemma of rthis jury wrus, of course, that it, based 
upon the evidence before it and upon the court's instruc-
tions, must eitlher convict of the one crime as to whdch the 
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evidence was equivocal in supporl of all elements thereof· 
or acquit of any crime, which result would be totally un~ 
supported by the evidence. The result in either event pro-
vides justice for neither the defendant nor the public, for 
the jury is forced to reach a result not supported by 1:1he 
evidence. 
In this regard, this court recognized in State v. Hymas, 
64 Utah 285, 230 Pac. 349 (1924) that: 
"H is, however, always a delicate matter for a 
trial court to withhold from ,the jury the right to 
find the accused guilty of a lesser or included of-
fense, and determine the question of the state of the 
evidence as a matter of law. That should be done 
only in very clear cases." 
This is not such a clear case. There is no eyewitness 
te-stimony evidencing defendant's adt except her own. There 
is no testimony as to her mental sta:te except her own. The 
state's evidence as to the environs of the act is garbled, 
painfully unintelligible, and, aJt points, meaningless (Tr. 
173-176, 177-182, 188-190). It is unclear how high the 
builet holes in the room were, or where they were located 
(Tr. 193-194, 198, 211). 
On the other hand, there was abundant evidence pro-
duced by the state and the defendant supporting, both in-
ferentially and explicitly, a conclusion that defendant's 
acts arose from sudden anger or heat of passion (Tr. 366, 
367, 368, 369, 372-373); that her acts, while perhaps greatly 
dangerous, were not those of a depraved mind, without 
regard of human life (Tr. 368-369); or tJhat her acts were 
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not even greatly dangerous as those calculated to put the 
lives of many persons in jeopardy (Tr. 372-373). 
Thus, the defendant walks in and finds Miller and 
Simmons in a questiona;ble circumstance. The defendant 
questions the propriety of the situation. Mil1er, the de-
fendant's former lover, beats her to the floor and pushes 
her out of the door. ·Defendant becomes angered and gets 
a gun intending to scare Miller. She shoots int-0 an open 
window which was over five feet from the ground. There 
was no calculation or determination to take a life or fo kill 
anyone, much less Jesse Melton. This was all in evidence 
before the jury to be given as much weight as it thought 
proper. But the court by its instructions removed that pre-
rogative from the jury and the latter was not permitted 
to consider any mitigating factors which would ameliorate 
the gravity of the act. And Iva Lee Gillian was found guilty 
of first degree murder. 
B. 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HA VE IN-
STRUCTED THE JURY ON LESSER INCLUD-
ED OFFENSES AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Where tJhe evidence is sufficient to support a lesser 
included offense, the trial court is duty bound to so insitruct 
the jury as a matter of law. People v. Carmen, 228 P. 2d 
281 (CaHf. 1951); People v. Yancy, 340 P. 2d 328 (Calif. 
1959); State v. Anderson, 352 P. 2d 972 (Ida. 1960); State 
v. Ulibarri, 355 P. 2d 275 (N. M. 1960); Harris V. State, 291 
P. 2d 372 (Okl·a.1955). 
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Some courts have articulated 'the rule as this: That 
failure to give instructions on included offenses where there 
is any evidence supportive of the included offense ~s preju-
dicial error. People v. Brown, 281 P. 2d 3'19 (Calff. 1955); 
People v. Burns, 200 P. 2d 134 (Calif. 1948). And in stat-
ing its version of the rule, the Washington Supreme Court 
has said that a lesser degree of the crime must be submitted 
along with the greater degree unless the evidence positively 
excludes any inference that the lesser crime was committed. 
State V. Gallagher, 103 P. 2d 1100 (Wash. 1940). 
The rule of this court e'loquently speaks for itself in 
State v. Ferguson, supra. There, Justice Straup noted: 
"If in a case of different degrees of the charged 
greater offense :there is sufficient evidence fo sub-
mit the case to the jury of the charged greater 
offense, I do not see where it is the prerogative of 
the court to 'direct the jury of what degree only the 
jury may find the defendant guilty, or direct 
1Jhem that, if they do not find him guilty of the 
charged greater offense, they must acquit him. To 
permit the court to do this is to permit it to be the 
judge of the facts. If the court for such purposes 
may so consider rand weigh the evidence and find 
the facts and thus so determine the degree, I see 
no reason why the court, in such a case where the 
evidence is conclusive and indisputably shows the 
defendant's guilt of the charged greater offense, 
where there is no rule or basis either in law or in 
fact or any doubt whatever, may not equally direot 
,a verdict of guilt. It is apparent tha:t the court may 
not do either, for under the Constitultion and the 
statute making the jury the 1sole judge of the facts, 
they may render any kind of verdict with respect 
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to any offense presented by and included within the 
indictment or information." 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING 
THE PROSECUTION TO CROSS-EXAMINE 
DEFENDANT A'S TO A PAST ACT OF AL-
LEGED MISCONDUCT WHICH HAD NO REL-
EVANCE TO THE CRIME CHARGED. 
On cross-e~amination of the defendant, by tJhe prose-
cutor, the court permitted an interrogaJtion, reiating to an 
incident occurring seven years before, in which it was in-
sinuated by 'the prosecutor that the defendant had unlaw-
fully Msaulted the deceased (Tr. 339-340, 377-379) : 
"Q. Now, you said you couldn't take a 1ife of 
anyone, is that right? 
"A. No, I couldn't. 
"Q. Well, prior to this time you took a knife 
to Mr. Melton and cut him up good, didn't you? 
"Mr. Mi:tsunaga: Objection, Your Honor. 
"The Witness: No, I did not. 
"Q. You were arrested for it. 
"Mr. Mitsun:aga: Your Honor, that's outside 
the scope of examination. 
"The Witness: No, I never was arrested for 
that. 
"The Court : Just a minute, Mrs. Gillian. 
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"Mr. Mitsunaga: 'Dhe Court has already made 
a ruling that that incident if it occurred at all oc-
curred seven or eight years ago. 
"Mr. Banks: She has testified. 
"The WitneS1s: Let him go ahead. I mean, this 
isn't true and you won't find it on the record where 
I was arrested for cutting Mr. MiHer up. 
"The Court : Mrs. Gillian, the orrly thing the 
Court's concerned with now is when your attorney 
or either attorney makes an objection that means 
tlhe Court has to make a ruling whether it's sus-
tained or overruled and I can't do that when some-
one's .talking. L~ me think aibout this and we'll 
know where we are. 
"Mr. Banks: She has testified that she couldn't 
take a life. I am priVTileged to go into this action of 
hers that could show that she could do an act that 
could result 1in great bodily injury or death. 
"Mr. Mitsunaga: Well, she might have stamped 
on a couple ants when she was child, too, but that 
has no relevancy to her entire life. The Court's al-
ready made a ruling that this matter has been too 
remote. 
"Mr. Banks: That was on a different matter. 
"The Court: Objection is overruled. 
"Q. Now, you did threaten him with a knife, 
didn't you. 
"A. No, I didn't threaten him. 1961 I was in 
1Jhe kitchen doing the dishes and he came in kicking 
me and slwpping me and I had a perrfog knife and 
I told him not to hit me anymore 1and that's as far 
as rthat went and there was no arrest for that. 
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"Q. You used the knife 1against him, didn't 
you, lbut Mm? 
"A. If I had threatened him with a knife it 
would have !been self defense. 
"Q. WeU., I know, but you did cut him, dddn't 
you? 
"A. No, I don't recaH cutting him. 
"Q. He had to go to the hospital. 
"A. Th:aJt's when I hit him over the head with 
the percu1ator. Had two stitches in hilS head. That 
wasn't a knife and thait's on .the record." 
The universally accepted general rU'le, 'as stated in 
State v. Dickson, 12 U'ta:h 2d 8, 361 P. 2d 412 (1961), is 
tha!t evidence of other acts or crimes of a defendant is not 
admissible if its effect is merely to disgrace the defendant 
or show a propensity to commit crime, and rtJhus only where 
the evidence has "speciral relevancy to prove the crime of 
Which the defendant stands charged may it be allowed for 
that purpose" 361 P. 2d ait 415. 
The incidenrt in question here - and the prosecutor 
seemed to !be rather confused as to the nature of that inci-
dent - to the extent that it is relevant at aH ito the killing 
of Jesse Melton, was remote [n time; did not involve the 
deceased; was an act of self~defen1se; resulted nether dn 
arrest nor charge, much 'less conviction; proved no material 
faClt; and dlid not tend ito slhow any motive, scheme, plan or 
system. Thus it had no "special relevancy .to prove the 
crime" of which the defendant stood charged as required 
under the Dickson test and was iniadmissrble. 
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Inasmuch as the effect of the prosecution's interroga-
tion on the jury's verdidt can not be measured or weighed, 
th'is Court, as ~ ha.a done in the past, should find prejudi-
cial error and grant defendant a new trial. State v. Poe, 
21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P. 2d 512. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted rthat under Uibah law, the 
tria;l court erred prejudicially in failing to 1instruct the 
jury, a;s requested, as to the lesser offenses of second de-
gree murder and voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, 
which are necessarily included within lthe greater offense 
of first degree murder; and in permitting the prooecutor 
to cross-examine the defendant regarding an act or crime 
which hlad no special relevancy to prove rthe crime of which 
the defendant was charged and which had occurred seven 
years before. 
Accordingly it ris urged that this court grant a new 
trial 
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